Dear reader, Since the advent of the patient safety movement in the late 1990s, 1 there has been considerable culture change around how to manage adverse events. The main shift has been one away from individual punishment and toward systems thinking. The systems thinking theory, or "blame-free" culture, recognizes that the majority of incidents in health care involve wellmeaning providers working in complex, imperfect systems prone to error. More recently, the safety movement has embraced the Just Culture model, which builds on systems thinking by incorporating accountability when appropriate. 2 Adverse events in health care often occur due to failures at multiple levels of complex processes, and thus there typically are many root causes and not one single root cause. After harmful or potentially harmful events, it is important to determine root causes to provide thorough review, organizational learning, and closure. The goals of root cause analysis (RCA) are to make care safer and more efficient by learning about vulnerabilities in health care processes. RCA can be used after any incident with harm or potential harm, including both adverse events and near misses/close calls, and can be applied to all phases of laboratory testing and beyond.
Using a modified illustrative example from our own laboratory that is similar to that of the reader, we can examine the important elements of a well-executed RCA. The incident involved the mislabeling of more than 25 cytology specimens because of a single upstream frameshift error (Fig. 1 ). We will use 2 specific techniques: the cause map and the fishbone diagram (Figs. 2 and 3, respectively) .
Timeliness
Despite the ongoing burden of daily operations, it is important to investigate the event as soon as possible after it is discovered to avoid memory lapses concerning specific details. In this case, the technologist was able to remember that she had been training a new employee during this process, possibly causing a distraction.
Involvement of Frontline Providers
All those involved in the process that led to the incident should participate in the RCA. Employees closest to the work understand vital information regarding workarounds and unsafe conditions and can pay special attention to deviations from standard workflow. In our experience, they are highly invested in understanding what happened after their involvement in an adverse event, and subsequently are highly motivated to design and implement quality improvement (QI) initiatives. In this case, leadership team members were under the impression that all labels were being scanned directly by bar codes so that little human error was possible. What they had not realized was that the bar-coded labels were printed in batches and that a person still had to select the correct label and apply it to the correct specimen jar.
Creation of a Shared RCA Document
The RCA document will act as a virtual postmortem pathology report of an event, with descriptive and interpretative elements.
The cause map A cause map (Fig. 2) is a visual explanation of why an event occurred. A coherent and cohesive story is created by moving from left to right and asking "why" or by inserting "because" between boxes.
3 For example, a diagnostic mix-up occurred in 25 specimens (why?) because 25 jars were mislabeled (why?) because there was a frameshift error (why?) because a technologist selected the incorrect labels (why?) because of human error and a manual process, and so on. A cause map creates connections between individual cause-and-effect relationships to help build a narrative via the building blocks of the map. It can be basic or it can be detailed, with as few as 2 and as many as hundreds of boxes. A cause map also has the capacity to have more than 1 adverse outcome for any given event (in this case, potential patient harm, wasted employee time, and lost revenue).
The fishbone diagram
The fishbone diagram (also known as an Ishikawa diagram) (Fig. 3 ) puts potential causes into general categories or "buckets," and reads from right to left, unlike the cause map. This method does not attempt to link relationships but instead creates a general brainstorm of possible related or unrelated root causes. The categories help prompt the user to think of potential contributing factors that may not have a direct relationship with each other but may be relevant. For example, the cytology laboratory was in the midst of a large move from one location to another, which may have caused disarray or distraction, the workflow was batched making it prone to mix-ups, and so on. Unlike the cause map, the fishbone diagram has only 1 outcome it can address. Judgment as to which technique to use depends on the event and on the user. However, keep in mind that any thoughtful, systematic event review is a step in the right direction when it comes to patient safety and QI.
Share Results
After the RCA is complete, sharing results helps to spread a culture of learning and transparency, reduces litigation, and promotes healing for physicians and patients. 4, 5 The document may be shared electronically, in person, or at a specific meeting. In our institution, the results are presented at a pathology morbidity and mortality conference, in which instead of presenting a traditional case of unexpected patient death, we review an operational adverse event. Remember to share results internally with all of those involved, not only leadership. Include frontline providers and involved clinical partners. A distilled version may be appropriate to share with affected patients in collaboration with your local risk managers and patient relations representatives. Contrary to the fear of "airing dirty laundry," we have found that transparency, disclosure, and joint QI consistently build trust and confidence across teams.
Performing Improvement Efforts
With any good RCA come causal opportunities for QI. In this example, perhaps the labeling process should have been automated, thereby minimizing human error. If that was not feasible, lower hanging fruit may be targeted (eg, no training of new employees permitted during critical identification steps, no Figure 1 . Illustration of the harm caused by a frameshift labeling error. By manually selecting 1 incorrect label and using all subsequent consecutive labels, the technologist inadvertently created a cascade of 25 specimen mix-ups.
batching of workflow, and so on). What realistically can be changed to make care safer? What kind of systems learning has occurred because of the incident? Tools for successful QI are beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that the implementation of effective QI initiatives on targets identified via RCA are the strongest motivator for productive future event reviews.
Is preanalytic error my problem?
The incident raised by our reader is one involving a preanalytic mislabeling error, occurring before slides come across the pathologist's desk. In a recent analysis of the events of 1 year in our own institution, we learned that greater than 70% of errors and near misses were preanalytic (unpublished data). Understanding this reality may motivate laboratory physicians to spread out our current investment in diagnostic error to include a more systematic investigation of preanalytic error. We may believe that blame lies outside our locus of control, with technologists, clinicians, or laboratory information systems. We may reprimand those we deem "responsible" for the error, failing to realize that they are operating within an imperfect system and that humans fail at a reliable rate. This is a serious oversight; as with the case of labeling errors similar to the one our reader describes, the sharpest diagnostic skill applied to the wrong patient is indeed a futile exercise.
What about negligence and individual responsibility?
Where do negligence and individual responsibility fit into "blame-free" systems learning? A rapid way to assess whether to use systems thinking or individual responsibility is a principle called the "substitution test." 2 The substitution test is an exercise in which the question is asked: might a physician or employee of similar background, training, and experience, working under the same environmental and situational circumstances have made the same error? This test can be conducted either as a common sense mental exercise or by blindly presenting the situation to other providers. Although the vast majority of cases are entirely or primarily systems-based, if performance is an issue, then certainly the appropriate human resources tools (which are beyond the scope of this article) should be used. What are the barriers to RCA? One of the challenges to these goals is the tendency to favor rapid resolution and "corrective action" after incidents, rather than systematic review and organizational learning. This tendency may cause leaders to jump to conclusions and implement changes for which we have little proof. Leaders may inadvertently "double down" on risky systems dependent on conscientious humans by using ineffective measures such as reeducation, reminders, added work, and punishment. Identifying systems vulnerabilities that lead competent providers to err is the central tenet of RCA and QI. The majority of centers face real resource and infrastructural limitations, including time, money, and staffing, which may limit their ability to perform ideal RCAs on all adverse events and near misses. This reality should prompt the reader to spend valuable resources on RCA and QI in reasonable proportion to the level of risk of patient harm for any given incident.
Conclusions
RCA is a vital tool with which to understand both systems and individual contributions to complex errors in health care. The most common methods with which to perform RCA are the cause map and the fishbone diagram. Using lessons learned from these techniques, successful QI initiatives can be implemented in a targeted and effective manner. An effectively executed RCA can build trust and morale with employees and help laboratories to achieve safe, accurate, and efficient care for patients.
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